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AVIC International a Success: How 
Regulatory Changes to CFIUS Has 
Limited Political Interference and 





Chinese businesses are wary of merging or acquiring United States 
companies due to a perceived hostile regulatory environment.  The 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) evaluates 
mergers and acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign companies for 
national security risks.  It may deny the transaction or make 
recommendations to the President to divest a completed deal if a risk is 
found.  After a string of highly public failed CFIUS reviews against Chinese 
acquirers, the process seemed insurmountable for Chinese investors.  
However, the recent success of a Chinese aviation firm, AVIC International, 
in acquiring a U.S. based aviation company, Teledyne Continental, indicates 
that the United States is not an impenetrable market for Chinese investors.  
In particular, AVIC International’s use of the informal prenotice review and 
mitigation agreement with CFIUS minimized political interference during 
the formal review and helped ensure a favorable outcome.  This note 
suggests that Chinese investors should follow AVIC International’s strategy 




* J.D. Candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law.  Special thanks to 
Hastings for putting on events like the China Town Hall, where I was first introduced to this 
issue and inspired to write this note. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Recession is widely seen as the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression, and has left deep wounds in the 
American economy.1  Despite the official end to the recession in 
2009, the United States is still recuperating from the millions of jobs 
lost in the process.2  The United States has reported positive 
economic growth since 2010,3 however, unemployment at the end of 
2011 was 8.5 percent, which is over 3 percent the pre-recession 
unemployment rate.4  In order to create more jobs in the United 
States, the country must stimulate greater economic growth.5  One 
key method of increasing growth is by attracting foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”) into the United States.6
The Obama administration has identified foreign investment as 
an important element to the country’s road to recovery.
 
7  The 
administration has actively welcomed FDI and has committed itself to 
making the United States the most attractive place for investment.8  
In particular, FDI will help accelerate current growth rates while also 
being the foundation for long-term economic growth.9  The 
administration has been successful at attracting foreign investment, 
which declined during the recession from 2007 to 2009.10
China has the largest foreign exchange reserves of any country,
  However, 
the key to attracting significant amounts of FDI is attracting China to 
invest in the United States. 
11
 
 1. David B. Grusky, Bruce Western, & Christopher Wimer, The Great Recession, 
RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, https://www.russellsage.org/publications/great-recession (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 
 2. Id. 
          3.   Data: GDP growth (annual), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).  
 4. Database, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 5. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Assessing Trends and Policies of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION (July 2008), 
http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/fdi2008.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Mary Bruce, White House Touts Growing Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., ABC 
NEWS BLOGS (Jun. 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/white-house-touts-
growing-foreign-direct-investment-in-the-us/. 
 8. Bruce, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank. 
org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 11. China’s Foreign-Exchange Reserves Surge Exceeding $2 Trillion, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 15, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alZgI4B1lt3s. 
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a large trade surplus,12 and is currently the world’s second largest 
economy.13  However, China currently spends much less in outward 
FDI compared to major developed countries.  In 2010 China’s FDI 
was 0.67 percent14 of its GDP, while the major developed countries15 
on average spend over 2 percent16 of their GDP on FDI.  Moreover, 
China’s FDI to the United States is significantly less than major 
developed countries.  In 2010 only 1.9 percent17 of China’s FDI went 
to the United States, while major developed countries directed more 
than 10 percent18 of its total FDI to the United States.  This suggests 
that not only will there be a significant increase in overall Chinese 
foreign investment as China continues to develop, but that even more 
so may be directed to the United States if China’s investment profile 
becomes more like developed countries.  This huge source of 
potential investment could very well accelerate growth in the U.S. to 
the level necessary to bring down unemployment,19 but this 
investment is not guaranteed.20
Obviously, the investment from China is not guaranteed for 
many reasons but one major reason is the belief among Chinese 
investors that the United States is a difficult place to invest due to 
political hostility.
 
21  In particular Chinese investors point to CFIUS on 
Foreign Investment in the United States’ (“CFIUS”) history of 
thwarting Chinese acquisition of domestic firms.22
 
 12. China Balance of Trade, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
china/balance-of-trade (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
  Moreover, the 
 13. China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321. 
 14. The World Factbook: China, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012); 2010 Statistical 
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2010), hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/ 1316069658609.pdf. 
      15. A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, About the IMF, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7. 
 16. UNCTADSTAT, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development available at 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx  (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). Refer to 
Appendix I for calculations. 
       17. Id.; See also 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Table 1, (2010), hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
accessory/ 201109/1316069658609.pdf.  
 18. UNCTADSTAT, supra note 16; OECD.StatExtracts, Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDI_ 
FLOW_PAR TNER# (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).  Refer to Appendix II for calculations.  
 19. David Barboza, As China Invests, U.S. Could Lose, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, 
www.nytimes. com/2011/05/04/business/global/04yuan.html. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Barboza, supra note 19. 
 22. Derek Scissors, A Better committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/ 
enhancing-the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius.  
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recent divestiture of private Chinese software company Huawei’s 
acquisition of California-based company 3Leaf Systems is seen as 
proof that politics still sway CFIUS’s review and creates an unfair 
investment environment for Chinese firms despite modern regulatory 
changes to the process.23
Despite the contrary example above, Chinese aviation firm 
AVIC International’s successful acquisition of the Alabama-based 
aviation manufacturing firm Teledyne Continental in 2011 tells a 
different story.
 
24  The fact that this acquisition was deemed to not 
implicate national security, in spite of AVIC International being a 
state-owned enterprise with ties to the Chinese government and in a 
politically sensitive industry, suggests that the CFIUS review is not 
politically hostile against all Chinese investors.25
The first part of this note will layout the legal framework of 
CFIUS and the changes made to it by the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act, the implementing Executive Order, and the 
relevant Treasury Regulation.  Next, a case study of AVIC 
International will highlight how these regulatory changes have 
reduced the level of political intervention in the CFIUS process. This 
discussion will identify particular changes in CFIUS and its 
procedures that disincentivize early response by Congress on such 
transactions and opportunities for foreign investors to limit political 
scrutiny.  Additionally, this note will compare AVIC International 
with Huawei and identify key strategic differences between the two 
companies that greatly impacted their interaction with CFIUS and the 
kind of political reaction to their investment.  Finally, solutions to 
remedy the poor perception of Chinese investors of the United 
States’ CFIUS review will be offered, including the adoption of AVIC 
International’s strategy by future Chinese investors and changes to 
  In particular, the 
complete lack of Congressional interference with the proposed deal 
indicates a departure from past political pressure on the CFIUS 
process.  Moreover, AVIC International’s success in contrast to 
Huawei’s failure indicates that the Chinese party acquirer strategy is a 
vital factor in minimizing potential political opposition and 
influencing CFIUS’s stance. 
 
 23. Chen Weihua, Pay the Lobbyists to Beat Double Standards, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 14, 
2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/14/content_12164992.htm. 
 24. China’s AVIC International Completes US Acquisition Deal, CHINA DAILY USA 
(Apr. 21, 2011), usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-04/21/content_12368667.htm; Teledyne 
Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC International, 
AVIATIONPROS.COM (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.aviationpros.com/press_release/10392512/ 
teledyne-technologies-agrees-to-sell-teledyne-continental-motors-to-avic-international. 
 25. See Edward Sun, Milbank Advises on First US Acquisition by Chinese Aviation 
Company, MILBANK (May 16, 2011), http://www.milbank.com/news/milbank-advises-on-first-u-
s-acquisition-by-chinese-aviation.html. 
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the data in CFIUS’ annual report to Congress to include individual 
country information in general and industry breakdowns. 
 
II.  THE ORIGINAL CFIUS: EXECUTIVE ORDERS, EXON-
FLORIO, AND THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE 
 
 CFIUS was established in 1975 by President Ford to help the 
presidency determine national security risks associated with foreign 
investment directed to the United States.26  Executive Order 1185827  
set up the basic framework of CFIUS, establishing it as an inter-
agency28 Committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury.29  
Executive Order 1266130 provided general guidelines of CFIUS’s 
responsibilities.  Executive Order 12661 tasked CFIUS with 
determining whether particular transactions warranted investigation, 
and if so, required CFIUS to conduct a 45-day investigation and 
advise the President of its findings.31
Under these Orders, the scope and authority of CFIUS was 
extremely limited.  Firstly, they lacked clear guidelines of what 
constituted a national security interest that warranted investigation, 
resulting in minimal voluntary reporting by foreign firms.  Therefore, 
CFIUS relied heavily on recommendations by the Department of 
Defense as to what transactions to investigate.
 
32  Secondly, the limited 
investigation timeframe of 45-days greatly limited the capability of 
CFIUS in conducting thorough investigations.33  Finally, the limited 
power of the President to directly alter these foreign transactions, 
through his power to declare a state of national emergency, similarly 
limited the power of CFIUS because their investigative findings and 
advice to the President had minimal actual consequences that could 
affect such foreign transactions.34
These shortcomings and increasing levels of foreign investment 
that Congress believed to concern national security resulted in 
 
 
 26. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMM. ON 
FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S.  1  (2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
138611.pdf. 
 27. Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7. 1975). 
 28. Exec. Order No. 11858, at §1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27. 1988). 
 31. Exec. Order No. 12661, at §3-201(1)(A). 
 32. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 3. 
 33. Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7, 1975). 
 34. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 4. 
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Congress passing the Exon-Florio amendment in 1988.35  Exon-Florio 
authorizes the President to investigate any merger or acquisition of 
United States companies by foreign persons that may result in shifting 
control over to these foreign entities.36  Additionally, it empowers the 
President to block or divest any transaction where there is “credible 
evidence”37 that the transaction could “impair national security,”38 
but only if all other presidential authority to remedy such risk of 
impairment would not be feasible.39  Moreover, the Treasury 
Department’s final regulation implementing the amendment 
stipulates that the President can request an investigation of a 
transaction that has not already been investigated at any time and 
divest the transaction if warranted.40  Though the President is given 
this power, CFIUS implements the amendment as the designated 
entity conducting the investigation into the national security 
implications of the foreign transaction.41
As a result, the CFIUS process was bolstered by the additional 
direction contained within the amendment.  The amendment directed 
CFIUS to determine the effects of the transaction on the national 
security of the United States by considering eleven specific areas of 
concern regarding national security.
 
42  This focused CFIUS’s 
investigation by providing a more concrete definition of national 
security.  Moreover, CFIUS is now instructed to conduct an initial 30-
day review, and if national security concerns are not addressed in that 
time, may initiate an additional 45-day investigation.43  This 
additional time expanded CFIUS’s ability to conduct thorough 
investigations.  Most importantly, the President’s power to block or 
divest a transaction greatly increased the power of CFIUS’s national 
security determination.  Thus, Exxon-Florio transformed CFIUS into 
an administrative body “with a broad mandate and significant 
authority to advise the President” and determine the outcome of 
foreign investment in the United States.44
In 1991, Congress provided even more direction to CFIUS 
 
 
 35. Leon G. Greenfield & Peter Lange, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, 6 THE THRESHOLD 
10, 10 (Winter 2005/2006), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com. 
 36. Id.  
 37. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 2007). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 5. 
 41. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170; Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 F.R. 779 (1988).  
 42. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170. 
 43. DAVID N. FAGAN, DELOITTE, THE U.S. REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR FDI 15 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_csg_ColumbiaFaganPaper_Chinese031809(3).pdf. 
 44. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 5. 
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through the “Byrd Amendment” to Exon-Florio.45  The Byrd 
Amendment requires CFIUS to investigate proposed mergers, 
acquisitions, or takeovers when the acquirer is controlled by or acting 
on behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition may result in 
control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United 
States that could affect the national security of the country.46
This framework for the CFIUS review disproportionately 
impacted Chinese investors.  First, almost all of the Chinese investors 
were state-owned enterprises often triggering a mandatory 
investigation under the Byrd Amendment.  Secondly, Chinese foreign 
investment has typically focused on acquiring know-how and 
technology, which implicates national security concerns under Exon-
Florio.
  This 
amendment added to the list of characteristics of what may constitute 
a national security risk, and for the first time, it created a situation 
where an investigation was mandatory. 
47  Thus, Chinese investors looking to acquire U.S. firms would 
almost certainly be subject to the CFIUS review. Chinese investors 
felt this was unfair, because the regulations seemed to target their 
investments and subject them to heightened CFIUS review.  This 
concern was further buttressed when, for the first and only time, the 
Presidential divestiture power was exercised under Exon-Florio 
against China Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation’s 
acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing Company.48
Despite CFIUS’s increased ability to regulate foreign 
acquisitions, Congress was still not satisfied with the process.  First, 
Congress was unhappy with the secrecy of CFIUS’s operations, 
because the secrecy hampered Congress’s ability to assess the 
thoroughness and accuracy of CFIUS’s investigations.
 
49  Moreover, 
Congress believed that the current scope of CFIUS’s national security 
analysis was too limited for modern day concerns.50
 
  This resulted in 
significant changes to CFIUS and their investigation. 
 
 
 45. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 6. 
 46. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170. 
 47. Nargiza Salidjanova, GOING OUT: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S OUTWAR FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 17 (Mar. 
30, 2011), available at http://www.uscc.gov/Research/going-out-overview-china%E2%80%99s-
outward-foreign-direct-investment. 
 48. Lawrence R. Fullerton, et al., Review of Foreign Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio 
Provision 151–52 (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Working Papers, Nov. 25, 1992), 
available at http://books.google.com. 
 49. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 2. 
 50. Id. 
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III.  THE NEW AND IMPROVED CFIUS: FINSA, EXECUTIVE 
ORDER, AND TREASURY REGULATION 
 
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) was 
passed in 2007 to amend Exon-Florio and in January 2008 President 
Bush issued Executive Order 13456 implementing the law.51  Later 
that year, the Treasury Department published regulatory guidelines 
on FINSA and the amended CFIUS review.52  Together, FINSA and 
the Treasury regulations formalized CFIUS’s practice of informal 
pre-notice review and mitigation agreements with foreign investors, 
expanded the scope of national security issues, changed the 
composition of CFIUS, and heightened CFIUS’s accountability to 
Congress. 53
Prior to the passage of FINSA, CFIUS would entertain informal 
reviews of proposed transactions.
 
54 These informal reviews gave 
CFIUS more time to conduct their investigations by easing 
compliance with the strict 30-day timeframe that commenced once 
official notice is filed.55  Though FINSA does not specifically allow 
this practice, the Treasury Regulation encourages voluntary notice 
and CFIUS, more specifically, expresses its preference for informal 
review.56
On the other hand, FINSA explicitly codifies CFIUS’s practice of 
negotiating mitigation agreements with parties when there are initial 
national security concerns.
  Thus, the lack of mention in FINSA for a specifically 
required practice for review has helped establish the informal review 
as a formalized step in the review process. 
57  Under the Act, CFIUS can “enter into, 
or impose, and enforce” any condition in order to “mitigate any 
threat to the national security of the United States that arise as a 
result of the covered transaction.”58  The act further requires CFIUS 
to conduct a “risk-based analysis” before imposing any mitigating 
conditions on the parties to the transaction.59
 
 51. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 2. 
  This practice has 
worked for the benefit of the parties, because it allows CFIUS to 
approve of more transactions despite initial security concerns.  
Moreover, in combination with the pre-notice informal review, many 
 52. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
 53. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 14. 
 54. Id. at 18. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
 57. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (2007). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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parties can implement these changes prior to the formal notice 
ensuring an expeditious and successful outcome from the CFIUS 
review process. 
Besides retaining the key practices of CFIUS, FINSA was also a 
response to perceived weaknesses in CFIUS’s analysis of national 
security issues.60  To address this concern, FINSA and the Executive 
Order made various changes to the composition of CFIUS.  The Act 
officially added the Secretary of Homeland Security onto CFIUS as a 
voting member, resulting in CFIUS having seven voting members, 
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of Energy and Commerce, and the Attorney General.61  
The implementing Executive Order added five observing members—
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for 
Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism—who have a duty to report to the 
President under certain situations.62
Finally, FINSA requires extensive reporting requirements by 
CFIUS to Congress in order to overcome the secrecy of its 
investigations.  Under FINSA CFIUS must provide an annual report 
to Congress that includes information on “investment trends with 
respect to types of investments, investors’ nationality, targeted sectors 
of the United States industry, and practices adopted by foreign 
acquirers.”
  Additionally, the Order reserves 
for the President the right to appoint any temporary member.  These 
changes to CFIUS provide a more comprehensive perspective as to 
the economic and security consequences of the transactions. 
63
All these changes to CFIUS aimed to improve CFIUS’s 
functioning to adequately protect Congress’s national security 
concerns regarding foreign transaction.  Ultimately, this increased 
mandate on CFIUS to consider Congress’s concerns changed the 
relationship between Congress and CFIUS by alleviating the need of 
Congress to intervene in particular transactions.  This essentially has 
  Moreover, CFIUS must notify Congress of each 
transaction they investigate after CFIUS has concluded its review. 
 
 60. Edward L. Rubinoff & Tatman Ryder Savio, CFIUS Implements FINSA to Exon-
Florio Foreign Investment Law, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 33, 33 (May 
2008). 
 61. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 8. 
 62. Id. at 8–9. 
 63. Ronald A. Oleynik & Antonia I. Tzinova, CFIUS Reform Brings More Tansparency to 
the Foreign Investment Review Process, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 1, 
2007, at 5. 
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given CFIUS more autonomy in their investigations, and has reduced 
the political intervention in foreign transactions as evidenced by the 
AVIC International deal. 
 
IV.  THE AVIC INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDY 
 
A.  Regulatory Changes Limiting Political Interference 
 
In April of 2011, AVIC International completed its acquisition of 
Teledyne Continental Motors’ general aviation piston engine 
manufacturing business for $186 million.64  AVIC International is the 
international branch of China Aviation Industry Corporation 
(“AVIC”).65  AVIC is the modern incarnate of the China National 
Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (“CATIC”), which 
is associated with China’s Ministry of Aerospace Industry and is one 
of China’s largest state-owned enterprises.66  AVIC International 
engaged in preotice review, filed a voluntary notice with CFIUS, 
agreed to specific mitigating conditions, and was approved within the 
30-day review period.67
AVIC International’s experience with CFIUS was largely void of 
direct political interference by Congress.  This is a marked departure 
from past Chinese acquisitions in sensitive industries, where it was 
typical for Congress to directly intervene in the CFIUS review and 
pressure foreign parties to withdraw their bid before a decision can be 
rendered.  For example, in 2005, China’s National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (“CNOOC”) bid to acquire United States oil company 
Unocal.
 
68  Within days of the offer, members of Congress expressed 
their fears that CFIUS would approve a CNOOC-Unocal deal 
because their narrow mandate would not be capable of a full 
assessment of the risks.69
 
 64. Teledyne Completes Sale of its Piston Engine Business, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110419007015/en/Teledyne-Completes-Sale-Piston-
Engine-Business. 
  This resulted in the House of 
 65. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, www.avic-intl.cn/avicIntl/home/index.do?cmd=goToChannel 
&cid=328, (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Sun, supra note 25; Charles A. Hunnicutt, $2 Million deal = Big CFIUS Mistake, 
TROUTMAN SANDERS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.troutmansanders.com/2-million-deal--big-
cfius-mistake-03-07-2011/. 
 68. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, YEE WONG & KETKI SHETH, US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: 
RISING TIDES, RISING STAKES 47 (2006), available at http://www.piie.com/publications/ 
chapters_preview /3942/05iie3942.pdf. 
 69. Hufbauer, supra note 68, at 47.  
NELLAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013  9:09 PM 
Spring 2013 AVIC INTERNATIONAL A SUCCESS 527 
Representative passing various bills to delay the CFIUS review 
process.70  Since there was no guarantee CFIUS would approve the 
acquisition, the delay made the acquisition too risky and expensive 
for CNOOC causing CNOOC to withdraw its bid.71  The next year, a 
study by the Department of Energy found that China’s national oil 
companies were not a threat to the United States economy and 
suggested that if CFIUS completed an investigation, the Department 
of Energy may have approved the deal.72
AVIC International’s experience indicates a departure from this 
kind of meddling relationship between Congress and CFIUS 
considering the fact that the deal was approved without petitioning by 
Congress members.  This change can be traced to the regulatory 
changes to CFIUS through FINSA and the implementing Executive 
Order.  These changes effectively safeguarded against Congress’s 
concerns with CFIUS’s process, thus reducing the need for direct 
intervention into CFIUS’s review. 
  Thus, Congress’s political 
concerns broke up a potentially valid foreign acquisition.  
One of FINSA’s main accomplishments was formalizing CFIUS’s 
practice of informal prenotice review and mitigation agreements.73  
Formalizing these two practices gave foreign investors a way to begin 
the process without attracting the attention of Congress and 
disincentivized Congressional interference during CFIUS’s review.  
Investors can use the prenotice informal review prior to even a formal 
bid for acquisition or merger.74  This is extremely beneficial for all 
investors because it allows the investor to get a review and feedback 
from CFIUS prior to any media or political backlash to the potential 
deal.  Investors such as AVIC International are increasingly using this 
option to better situate their company and the details of the 
acquisition before formal notice.75
Additionally, formalizing the mitigation capabilities of CFIUS 
greatly reduces Congress’s incentive to intervene prior to a complete 
CFIUS review.  FINSA established a broad power of CFIUS to not 
  Thus, this prenotice review allows 
foreign investors to escape early political opposition that may 
undermine a deal that may not have real security implications upon 
further investigation. 
 
 70. Hufbauer, supra note 68, at 48. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 50. 
 73. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,572 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
 74. Amy E. Worlton, John Reynolds & Cari Stinebower, New CFIUS Rules Largely Codify 
Existing Practice, Including Increased Scrutiny, WILEY REIN (Apr. 2008), www.wileyrein.com/ 
PUBLICATIONS.CFM?SP=ARTICLES&ID=707. 
 75. Leon G. Greenfield & Peter Lange, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, The Threshold — 
The Newsletter of the Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., Vol. VI Issue 1 at 13. 
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only suggest but also force certain conditions onto a foreign investor 
in order to mitigate national security concerns.76  This process 
essentially obviates the need for Congress to intervene during the 
investigation because the mitigation agreement may completely 
eliminate the concern.  AVIC International agreed to a long list of 
mitigating conditions including promises to retain manufacturing in 
Alabama, expand the manufacturing facility, and retain local 
employees.77  This effectively addressed the key political concern of a 
foreign takeover of a major employer in Alabama, eliminating the 
need for Congressional interference.78
FINSA and the Executive Order’s changes to the composition of 
CFIUS has expanded the perspectives represented in CFIUS.  In 
particular, adding members whose focus is national security rather 
than economic has instilled greater Congressional trust in CFIUS’s 
investigation and recommendations.
  Thus, formalizing mitigation 
agreements delays political intervention into the CFIUS investigation, 
and allows CFIUS to complete their initial review independently. 
79  Prior to FINSA, members of 
Congress had expressed concerns for the motivations of the Treasury 
and Commerce Secretaries.80  Though the Secretaries were tasked to 
consider national security concerns as members of CFIUS, the 
departments they represent are generally pro-investment.81  Thus, 
Congress often was not confident that reviews primarily conducted by 
either Secretary would give enough weight to security issues.82
Moreover, the required reporting requirements have relaxed the 
extent of direct Congressional intervention in CFIUS’s practices and 
investigations.
  
Congress’s confidence in the review was improved by adding the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as well as five observing members to 
balance the pool of perspectives in CFIUS; this reduced Congress’s 
motivation to interfere. 
83  The requirement that CFIUS must inform Congress 
of every transaction after it conducts its investigation ensures that 
Congress is aware of every potential deal.84
 
 76. 50 U.S.C.A § 2170 (West 2012). 
  This essentially reduces 
Congress’s scrutiny of proposed mergers and acquisitions it comes 
 77. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC 
International, supra note 24.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Alan P. Larson & David M. Marchick, Foreign Investment and National Security: 
Getting the Right Balance, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 13 (July 18, 2006),  
i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CFIUSreport.pdf. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 50 U.S.C. § 2061 (West 2007). 
 84. 50 U.S.C. § 2061. 
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across in the media, because Congress can rely on CFIUS notifying 
them with sufficient time to act if Congress sees fit.  As in the case of 
AVIC International, the company had already begun discussions with 
CFIUS prior to any media publication of the proposed deal, allowing 
for an objective review by CFIUS.85
However, Huawei critics argue that CFIUS’s review is still 
subject to political interference as evidenced by the petitioning by 
Congressional members for CFIUS to review Huawei’s acquisition 
and their accusations that Huawei was connected to the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).
  This is especially beneficial for 
Chinese investors with initial security issues, because they have time 
to work out those issues before Congress examines the deal, unlike 
the CNOOC incident where Congress intervened beforehand. 
86  Huawei does present a more politically 
active situation than AVIC International.  However, Congress’s 
petitioning only resulted in CFIUS requiring Huawei to file a notice 
for investigation.87  CFIUS was able to complete their investigation 
without being delayed or otherwise obstructed by Congress and 
individually determined there was a national security issue.88
However, one might argue that the political intervention by 
Congress has merely changed form, from directly interfering with 
CFIUS, to covertly interfering by influencing CFIUS’s decision itself.  
This argument is supported if Huawei’s contention that it does not 
have any connection with the PLA is true, since CFIUS’s national 
security analysis seems to rest on this issue.
  Thus, 
even Huawei’s experience indicates that FINSA and the Executive 
Order has successfully minimized political intervention into CFIUS’s 
review. 
89  However, many sources 
confirm that Huawei’s ownership structure is very opaque making it 
difficult to definitively dispel its purported connection with the 
PLA.90
Huawei does have an argument that the accusation by Congress 
  Thus, CFIUS’s decision was ultimately based on existing 
national security concerns rather than Congressional pressure for a 
particular outcome. 
 
 85. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC 
International, supra note 24. 
 86. Dan Ikenson, Despite Huawei’s Experience America is Increasingly Open to Chinese 
Investment, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/02/23/despite-
huaweis-experience-america-is-increasingly-open-to-chinese-investment/. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Ikenson, supra note 86. 
 89. Paul Weiss, Huawei Resists CFIUS Demand to Divest U.S. Technology Firm, 
CURRENT TELECOM DEVELOPMENTS (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.paulweiss.com/files/ 
Publication/727b4a08-a98c-4610-a01f-7f8fb2af2f29/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1f71cd  
47-3459-47f6-bd74-80492f937953/CTD2-18-11.pdf. 
 90. Ikenson, supra note 86. 
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tainted the overall CFIUS review and subjected Huawei to 
heightened scrutiny by CFIUS.  Essentially, if Congress never said 
that it believed that Huawei was connected to the PLA, when CFIUS 
reviewed Huawei’s ownership structure the fact there was no clear 
indication of a connection would have been enough.  Instead, CFIUS 
had to disprove the connection.  This may be true, and the regulatory 
changes are not equipped to deter this kind of interference by 
Congress.  However, this kind of bias from statements by political 
leaders on the CFIUS review is not inherent in the process as evident 
by the AVIC International deal.  In fact, AVIC International suggests 
that even this form of subtle political influence on CFIUS can be 
avoided by key strategic choices by the Chinese investor. 
 
B.  Chinese Investor Strategy 
 
AVIC International’s success in contrast to Huawei’s failure is 
extremely significant.  Both companies have ties to the Chinese 
government91 and both tried to acquire businesses in key industries of 
importance to national security,92
A key difference between AVIC International’s and Huawei’s 
strategies was the fact that AVIC International voluntarily filed with 
CFIUS while Huawei only filed after it was asked by CFIUS to do 
so.
 suggesting that the reason for a 
particular CFIUS decision under such conditions does not rest on a 
general bias against Chinese government affiliated companies.  
Instead, a close examination of AVIC International’s approach to the 
investment compared to Huawei indicates that the Chinese investor’s 
strategy is a vital factor in the CFIUS review. 
93  This was a major misstep for Huawei because it raised suspicion 
within CFIUS before the review even began.  CFIUS not only 
inferred from the lack of notice that Huawei was trying to avoid 
review,94 but also looked at the small dollar amount of the deal ($20 
million) as another deliberate action by Huawei to complete the 
acquisition under CFIUS’s radar.95
 
 91. Ikenson, supra note 86; AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65. 
  Thus, not voluntarily filing with 
CFIUS is looked at as a red flag to scrutinize the transaction more 
closely to determine whether the investor was trying to avoid 
 92. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65. 
 93. Ikenson, supra note 86; Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental 
Motors to AVIC International, supra note 24. 
 94. Scott M. Flicker & Dana M. Parsons, Huawei-CFIUS Redux: Now It Gets Interesting, 
PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT (Mar. 2011), www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/ 
1868.pdf. 
 95. Ikenson, supra note 86. 
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CFIUS’s review because of an existing national security issue. 
Huawei advisors stated that they avoided filing notice, because 
Huawei had been implicated by the United States government in 
previous transactions as having a connection with the Chinese 
military.  In 2010, Huawei’s attempted joint deal to buy out United 
States telecommunications company SprintNextel was heavily 
opposed by members of Congress due to the belief that Huawei had 
ties to the PLA and access to SprintNextel’s network would leave 
U.S. airwaves vulnerable to military interceptions.96  Huawei 
adamantly denied such association.  However, the opposition from 
Congress pressured Huawei to withdraw its bid prior to a complete 
CFIUS review.97  Huawei stated that it believed it would be unfairly 
treated if it notified CFIUS as in the SprintNextel deal and structured 
the deal merely to avoid that bias.98
AVIC’s old alias CATIC, tried to acquire MAMCO in 1990.
  However, AVIC International 
also has had a troubled history with CFIUS.  Thus its current success 
indicates that past behavior does not necessarily prejudice the present 
analysis by CFIUS. 
99  
The transaction was subject to CFIUS review because the technology 
purchased may have had military applications.100  CFIUS ultimately 
recommended to the President to divest the company, due to 
CATIC’s prior violations of United States export regulations for 
purchasing prohibited materials for the Chinese military and 
CATIC’s association with the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace 
Industry.101  CATIC’s past history with CFIUS is very similar to the 
issues Huawei faced in the SprintNextel deal, but AVIC 
International’s voluntary notice did not suffer due to this.  Rather, the 
voluntary notice led to a thorough investigation, which found a very 
different organization that did not implicate national security 
concerns.102
Huawei’s argument may have more force if one considers the 
  Thus, Huawei’s strategy of non-notice to avoid bias does 
not seem necessary because AVIC International shows that CFIUS is 
able to move on from past indiscretions provided that the 
investigation warrants such a result. 
 
 96. Weiss, supra note 89. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Flicker & Parsons, supra note 94. 
 99. Lawrence R. Fullerton et al., Review of Foreign Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio 
Provision 151 (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Working Papers, Nov. 25, 1992), 
available at http://books.google.com. 
 100. Id. at 151.  
 101. Id. at 151–52. 
 102. Dara A. Panahy & Li Chen, CFIUS Challenges for China Companies Investing in the 
US, MILBANK, http://transasialawyers.com/publicfiles/N2-Milbank-E.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012). 
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timeframe between each company’s prior unsuccessful interaction 
with CFIUS and the current transaction.  More than twenty years 
passed between AVIC International’s transactions, while only about 
one year passed between Huawei’s transactions. This suggests that 
the length of time between transactions allowed for the bias to 
subside against AVIC International while the short time between 
transactions means that even if Huawei voluntarily notified CFIUS 
the bias would have still impacted the decision.  This argument 
definitely has support, because the press surrounding AVIC 
International’s acquisition did not mention the company’s past as 
CATIC.  Also, the mitigating conditions to the deal focused on 
domestic labor issues rather technology privacy, indicating that 
CFIUS was not concerned that AVIC International would repeat 
those practices.103  Despite the strength of this argument, Huawei’s 
strategy still failed, because the lack of notice ultimately exacerbated 
the bias.  Huawei’s action of completing an acquisition in an industry 
with similar national security concerns as the SprintNextel deal so 
soon after without notice was a signal to CFIUS that those concerns 
still exist warranting an investigation.104
Another key difference between AVIC International’s and 
Huawei’s strategy is that AVIC International took substantial steps to 
change its image between the CATIC-MAMCO divestiture and the 
Teledyne acquisition. CATIC was criticized for purportedly buying 
engines for business purposes but in fact giving it to the Chinese 
military to reverse engineer.
  Thus, the potential existence 
of bias is a reason to voluntarily notify CFIUS in order to challenge 
that preconceived belief against the foreign investor. 
105
In 2008, after the CATIC-MAMCO incident, CATIC changed its 
corporate structure.
  Thus, the main security concern with 
CATIC at the time of the MAMCO deal was that it was connected 
with the Chinese military and its business dealings were not purely 
economically motivated. Since then, AVIC International changed its 
business structure, established itself as an internationally competitive 
company, and has worked on its reputation within the aviation 
industry.  These changes shifted the dynamics of this company’s 
interaction with the United States government undermining the 




 103. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC 
International, supra note 24. 
  AVIC and AVIC International were created 
 104. Ikenson, supra note 86. 
 105. LAWRENCE R. FULLERTON & CHRISTOPHER G. GRINER, REVIEW OF FOREIGN 
ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE EXON-FLORIO PROVISION 150–51 (1992). 
 106. AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65. 
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as equal shareholders of CATIC.107  The military arms trade business 
was separated out from AVIC and AVIC International as CATIC’s 
sole practice.108  This structural change created a degree of separation 
between AVIC International’s business practice from its past military 
dealing, essentially diluting the potential government influence on the 
company’s foreign business activities.  AVIC International still holds 
a 50 percent stake in CATIC and its military arms business,109
Additionally, AVIC International became an international 
player in the aviation industry by aggressively expanding its presence 
and network of trade partners across the world.  AVIC International 
company motto is to “build up a multinational corporation with 
international competiveness.”
 so it is 
not void of a connection to the Chinese military; however, this 
restructuring goes a long way to clarify the relationship and create 
transparency in AVIC International’s business dealings. 
110  Since 2008, AVIC International has 
established over 60 overseas branches in over 30 countries and has 
clients in over 180 countries.111  Moreover, AVIC International has 
been on the Fortune 500 list since 2009.112
Finally, AVIC International has established a solid reputation 
within the aviation industry as a company with quality aviation 
products and as a successful exporter.  This is reinforced by the fact 
that Teledyne completed the deal with AVIC International because 
they were confident AVIC International would help Teledyne expand 
internationally and make it competitive in the modern market.
  All these factors indicate 
the company’s commitment to the international economy and the 
furtherance of their business, thus shifting the presumption that the 
company has ulterior motives to one that is market-driven. 
113  
Additionally, AVIC International has contracts with the leading firms 
in the business, including a long-standing supply relationship with 
Boeing and technological and manufacturing partnerships with 
Hamilton Sundstrand and Safran.114
 
     107.  AVIC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65. 
  By establishing itself as a key 
player within the aviation industry, AVIC International repositions 
itself from being a major Chinese state-owned aviation company to 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Xin Dingding, Aerospace Firm AVIC in Fortune Rank List, CHINA DAILY (July 10, 
2009), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-07/10/content_8406574.htm. 
 113. Teledyne Technologies Agrees to Sell Teledyne Continental Motors to AVIC 
International, supra note 24. 
 114. Jon Grevatt, Paris Air Show 2011: AVIC Expands International Partnerships, IHS 
(June 21, 2011), http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-securityreport.aspx?id= 106592 
9845. 
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being a major aviation company, period.  Together, these changes to 
AVIC International’s business structure and practices undermines 
Congress’s ability to influence CFIUS’s review with past security 
concerns, further insulating the deal from political intervention. 
Huawei by contrast, did not take any remedial steps to address 
the concerns Congress lodged against its earlier deal with 
SprintNextel  before acquiring 3Leaf Systems.  This allowed Congress 
to reassert its previous concerns regarding Huawei, inciting CFIUS to 
review the transaction.  Congress’s concerns ultimately were the basis 
of CFIUS’s recommendation to divest.  Huawei could have limited 
the influence of past security concerns by taking bona fide measures 
to weaken Congress ability to use the same argument against their 
future investments.  In particular, AVIC International’s structural 
change is instructive for Huawei as a viable option to dispel fears of 
its connection with the PLA. 
However, Huawei might argue that the changes AVIC 
International undertook were not the reasons for the lack of political 
opposition, since Huawei is also a multinational corporation, on the 
Fortune 500 list, the second largest telecommunications company in 
the world, and in fact is a private business as opposed to a state-
owned enterprise, and yet was still not successful under CFIUS’s 
review.115  These similarities between AVIC International and 
Huawei are poignant and do indicate these characteristics alone are 
not enough to change political perception of a Chinese investor.  
However, Huawei assumed all these characteristics by the time of the 
SprintNextel acquisition and not between the SprintNextel deal and 
3Leaf Systems deal.116
Overall, AVIC International’s success indicates that CFIUS is to 
Chinese investors.  More importantly, AVIC International has laid a 
roadmap of how Chinese investors can steer their interaction with 
CFIUS in a positive direction.  Through strategic choices such as 
using the pre-notice informal review and taking steps to challenge the 
ability of Congress to pose political opposition, Chinese investors 
have the power to set themselves up for a speedy and successful 
CFIUS review despite past problems with CFIUS. 
  This reinforces AVIC International’s strategy 
that the key tactic in limiting past political opposition is to engage in 




 115. Sheridan Prasso, What Makes China Telecom Huawei so Scary?, CNNMONEY (July 28, 
2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/07/28/what-makes-china-telecom-huawei-so-scary/. 
 116. Id. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
AVIC International’s successful acquisition of Teledyne 
indicates that the CFIUS process is not necessarily hostile to Chinese 
investors. AVIC International’s overall approach to the CFIUS 
review, specifically using FINSA’s pre-notice review and mitigation 
agreement and voluntarily filing with CFIUS was vital to its success. 
Other Chinese investors looking to merge with or acquire United 
States’ companies should adopt this approach. The pre-notice review 
and implementation of suggested mitigation prepares the deal 
substantively for a successful formal CFIUS review, while voluntary 
notification insulates the deal from political interference. This overall 
strategy changes the dynamics of the CFIUS process to one where the 
Chinese party has more control over the outcome of the deal. 
Therefore, Chinese investors are advised to follow AVIC 
International’s strategy in order to ensure a hospitable investment 
environment in the United States. 
However, AVIC International also highlights the disparity 
between the perception and reality of Chinese foreign investment in 
the United States.  AVIC International depicts a much friendlier 
environment for Chinese investors than the popular examples of 
Chinese experiences in the United States such as CNOOC and 
Huawei.  Unfortunately, the success of AVIC International and its 
strategy may not be enough to change the perception of Chinese 
investors, since it is only one instance of success against many 
instances of failed CFIUS review.  This is a problem for the future 
growth of Chinese FDI because the negative perception is enough to 
deter investment.117
There are many options to change this negative perception.  For 
one, CFIUS itself can be a powerful agent for change.  In particular, 
CFIUS can release information regarding the number of notifications, 
withdrawals, approvals, and divestitures of Chinese investors each 
year.  This could easily be done as part of CFIUS’s annual report to 
Congress, which is made publically available.  Currently the report 
already provides statistics in each of these categories based on region, 




 117. Sheridan Prasso, Chinese Investors Still Searching for U.S. Welcome Mat, CNNMONEY 
(May 4, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/04/news/international/chinese_investo 
rs_america.fortune/index.htm. 
  However, it is difficult to 
extrapolate from those numbers, since multiple countries are grouped 
together, and it is difficult to find comprehensive information of those 
 118. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 29 (Dec. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Do cuments/2011%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf. 
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countries investment histories.  Therefore, it is near impossible to 
discern what proportion of each category represents Chinese 
investors.  By breaking down the numbers by country, CFIUS will 
give an accurate picture of CFIUS’s treatment of Chinese investors.  
Releasing this information could possibly change Chinese investors’ 
perception of, and ultimately encourage greater, investing in the 
United States. 
Moreover, by releasing the information, CFIUS could also 
implicitly impact its own behavior in favor of Chinese investors.  
CFIUS has an interest in being seen as a legitimate authority in 
determining national security issues with foreign transactions.  Thus, 
publishing the numbers by country may provide an incentive in 
CFIUS to be more discerning when they recommend divestiture so 
that they can defend those numbers with authority.  Thus, releasing 
country data, can initiate self-policing within CFIUS to limit political 
influence on their decisions. 
CFIUS can also break down individual country information into 
industries.  Chinese investors have expressed their hesitancy to invest 
after the Huawei incident despite not being in the technology 
industry.119  This is because there is an overall perception of hostility 
towards Chinese investors. Currently the report aggregates regional 
data in nine industries.120
Information is the key to changing perception.  Not only does the 
information itself present objective data for Chinese investors to 
accurately ascertain the investment environment in the United States, 
but it is also a step towards greater transparency.  This gesture of 
goodwill on the part of CFIUS, to allow itself to be accountable to 
individual country investors, could encourage Chinese investors 
regardless of what the data indicates. 
  However, if the report broke down the 
information on an industry-by-industry level, Chinese investors can 
determine whether they are in an industry that may have better 
results with CFIUS, rather than being discouraged by failed deals of 
companies in different industries. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
AVIC International’s successful CFIUS review is a clear example 
of how key regulatory changes to CFIUS’s power has created a 
process that minimizes political interference and maximizes a Chinese 
 
 119. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 118. 
 120. Id. 
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investor’s chance for a successful CFIUS review. Moreover, AVIC 
International’s strategy of voluntarily notifying CFIUS allayed 
political backlash to the deal. Therefore, Chinese investors should not 
be deterred from investing in the United States, but should follow the 
AVIC International model other Chinese to navigate the CFIUS 
process successfully. However, as the United States continues to 
encourage foreign investment to stimulate growth, it will also be 
important for CFIUS to dispel the perception among Chinese 
investors that it is difficult to invest in the United States.  CFIUS 
should include country-by-country data in their annual report on 
general investment categories so that Chinese investors can 
objectively evaluate CFIUS’s treatment of Chinese investors.  
Moreover, CFIUS should include an industry breakdown for each 
country, and indicate the approval rates for each industry.  This will 
help create a more nuanced appreciation for CFIUS’s decisions and 
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Appendix I 
 
Country 2010 Total FDI 
Outflow (Billions 
U.S. Dollar) 
FDI Output % of GDP 
G7 Nations 
Canada 38.585 2.45% 
France 76.867 3.00% 
Germany 109.321 3.33% 
 Italy 32.655 1.59% 
Japan 56.263 1.03% 
United Kingdom 39.502 1.75% 
United States 304.399 2.09% 
G7 Nations Average 2.18% 
 













U.S. FDI % of 
Total FDI 
Outflow 
Canada 5.522 38.585 13.534% 
France 9.336 76.867 12.146% 
Germany 17.362  109.321 15.882% 
Italy 1.326 32.655 4.061% 
Japan 17.612 56.263 31.308% 
United 
Kingdom 
23.931 39.502 60.582% 
 
